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Summary 
The growth of wind generation in distribution networks is leading to the development of Active 
Network Management (ANM) strategies. ANM systems aim to increase the capacity of renewable and 
distributed generation (DG) that can connect to the network. In addition to DG, ANM schemes can 
also include storage devices and Demand Side Management (DSM) strategies.  
Currently ANM schemes are mainly part of network research and development programmes, funded 
through network innovation schemes. In future, ANM schemes will need to cover the costs of 
establishing such a scheme through payments from the network owners and the users of the network. 
This paper discusses the current charging arrangements which account for network upgrades and the 
access arrangements for wind farms connecting to networks which are close to capacity. The Orkney 
ANM scheme is used as a case study, where the costs of the implemented ANM scheme are 
compared to conventional network upgrades.  
In order to run ANM as a ‘business as usual’ case, there must be a way in which to recover the costs 
incurred in implementing and operating an ANM scheme on the network. These costs could be 
recovered through Use of System (UoS) charging, and there is an opportunity for domestic customers 
participating in an ANM scheme (through Demand Side Management, for example) to further reduce 
electricity bills by providing ancillary services to the network.  
ANM may increase the cost of electricity for domestic customers, however this increase can be 
considered substantially less than the cost incurred for significant network upgrades.  
1 Introduction 
Recent reviews, consultations, and developments such as RIIO-T1 [1] by the gas and electricity 
regulator, Ofgem have placed a strong emphasis on developing innovative solutions in the way in 
which they manage networks. Active Network Management (ANM) is just one of these innovative 
solutions. ANM is the use of IT, automation and control to manage grid constraints associated with 
the integration of distributed generation. ANM can be used to manage energy producing or 
consuming devices to resolve network constraints on both Transmission and Distribution systems. 
As part of ANM schemes, the network owner/operator may be required to invest in additional network 
management equipment. This may include 
 Communications 
 Controllers -  for individual users of the network – both generator and demand, and at 
domestic and commercial level 
 Additional Operation and Maintenance costs 
 Staff – either additional staff, or training existing staff 




The additional costs associated with ANM can be compared to the costs associated with upgrading 
the physical assets on the network i.e. increasing capacity of existing lines, or the addition of new 
circuits.  
This paper discusses the format ANM contracts for wind generators might take in a ‘business as 
usual’ case, the benefits of utilising ANM schemes to delay the cost of network upgrades, and the 
mechanisms through which the costs of ANM may be recovered and  
2 Access Arrangements and ANM Schemes 
Both the UK Government and the Scottish Government have targets [2, 3] to meet in the coming 
decades with regard to clean energy resources. Delays to network upgrades would result in a large 
volume of renewable technologies, such as wind generation, prevented from connecting to the 
network. ANM is one method of facilitating connection of non-firm generation in the interim while 
waiting for additional network capacity. 
The Register of Active Network Management Pilots, Trials, Research, Development and 
Demonstration Activities was published in 2008 [4] and lists all projects related to ANM systems, from 
research projects through to full scale deployment. Network issues that can be resolved through the 
use of ANM include voltage control, power flow management and frequency issues.  
The funds for ANM projects typically come through regulator and government funding. The Low 
Carbon Network Fund (LCNF) [5] was introduced by Ofgem in 2010. The fund provides support to 
DNOs in order to allow them to test new technology, and trial operational and commercial 
arrangements. The aim of the LCNF is to improve knowledge and understanding of DNOs and try out 
new and high risk technologies that will help in the move towards a low carbon economy.  
Registered Power Zones [6] are areas of the National Grid network which have specifically 
designated for research and development purposes. They are used to try and test out new 
technologies which will aid the connection of DG at distribution level. There are three RPZ in the UK – 
Skegness and The Fen, Orkney Islands and Marsham primary.  
RPZ and the LCNF are of key importance for the development and deployment of smart grid systems.  
3 Types of Access Arrangements 
In order to increase the level of generation connected to a network, that is close to capacity, networks 
can offer a ‘non-firm’ connection arrangement where the generator will be asked to reduce output at 
times when there are constraints on the network e.g. periods of low demand and high generation. 
There is no compensation given for curtailment of non-firm generation.  
The current method of access arrangement for multiple non-firm generators connected to an ANM 
schemes, in Shetland and Orkney is ‘Last in First Off’ (LIFO) [7, 8]. In this arrangement the newest 
generator or last to connect will be first to be asked to curtail should the situation arise. This method is 
simple to implement, transparent and will not have a negative effect on generators previously 
connected to the network. However, this method may not be the most efficient way to manage the 
network, both electrically and economically.  
Other options for access arrangements are discussed in [9] and [10]. A number of these are listed 
below 
 Pro-rata: All generators are curtailed equally, in either absolute or relative terms 
 Shedding Rota: Generators curtailed according to a rota defined by agreement between the 
System Operator and participants.  




 Curtailment Market: Generators are curtailed according to a market system, such as 
submitted bids into a balancing mechanism.  
 Greatest Technical Benefit 
 Greatest Carbon Benefit 
Access Arrangements can be split into two main groups, Market Arrangements, and Non Market 
Arrangements. In all cases, the network operator must assess the impact of the arrangements in 
terms of fairness, transparency, compliance with current grid codes, flexibility, robustness and their 
ability to ensure a safe, secure and reliable power system. The impact of the access arrangement on 
generator long term profit must also be considered, as this will influence the ability of the developer to 
raise funds for the project from a lending institution.  
Non-Market arrangements are arrangements which use predetermined rules to curtail non-firm 
generation connected a network. These rules are decided by the DNO and generators wishing to 
connect to the network must adhere to these rules. Generators will have no control over the order of 
curtailment. Non-market arrangements include LIFO, Pro-Rata, rota and technical best. These 
arrangements are typically the most straight forward to establish on the network and do not require 
any changes to grid codes etc. 
Market arrangements pass some of the control back to generators in terms of their ability to influence 
the order of curtailment through monetary bids and offers. This could take the form of a curtailment 
market where participants bid to remain connected, or be curtailed during a period of congestion. Or 
participants could bid for a location on the curtailment rota. The creation of market arrangements may 
require a change to grid codes and they may also encourage incumbent generators to enter the 
curtailment market alongside non-firm wind generators.  
4 Operational and Installation costs of ANM 
Incentive schemes and research funding has encouraged the deployment of ANM schemes in a 
number of distribution networks. ANM is considered a significant alternative to network 
reinforcements, mainly due to the difference in costs between the two.  
The Aura-NMS (Autonomous Regional Active Network Management System) [11] is a research 
consortium consisting of seven universities, two distribution network operators and ABB. The 
research focuses on investigating real time control algorithms for voltage control, power flow 
management and restoration. One of the functions of AuRA-NMS is to automatically detect and offer 
solutions to thermal overloads which can be caused by the unpredictability of renewable distributed 
generation. AuRA-NMS has developed control techniques which can be applied to any network 
topology i.e. all techniques developed are flexible.  
In the cost-benefit analysis of Aura-NMS [12], a comparison of voltage control and constraint 
management techniques proposed by AuRA-NMS and the existing techniques used in a passive 
network is made. DG is added to two nodes on a small 33kV distribution network, and the changes in 
voltage and constraints noted. A cost is assigned to voltages in terms of the number of tap changes 
required by transformers. The cost of constraints is priced per MWh. The paper concludes that the 
value of the ANM increases as the level of DG connected to the network increases.  
Further work by the authors in [13], has shown that network investment can be deferred or reduced by 
deploying an ANM scheme (AuRA-NMS in this case). The network planning method proposed by the 
authors considers only the reinforcement on circuits. The objective of the model is to minimise the 
total cost of network investment and curtailment of wind. Two operational conditions (each with 
different renewable generation outputs) are considered  
 Peak load with zero output of renewable generation 




 Minimum load with renewable generation at a maximum 
The problem is solved iteratively using Benders’ decomposition method. The curtailment of DG output 
is optimised when the security constraint, N-1 contingency, is violated, and loss of curtailment 
calculated based on the output duration curve (obtained from historical data on wind speed and the 
power curve). 
The results of the simulation have shown that by installing AuRA-NMS, the network reinforcements of 
the network in question can be reduced from four circuits to two. The cost of the ANM scheme, plus 
the two circuits is at a lower cost than the construction of four circuits based on an electricity price of 
£50/MWh and the cost of ANM scheme being £700k. A sensitivity analysis was carried out to assess 
the impact of changing costs of electricity and ANM schemes and it was found that the cost of the 
ANM scheme was still the least cost solution.  
The authors have assumed that the cost of ANM would be provided by an ‘innovation fund’ however 
as ANM schemes become the ‘business as usual’ case, the funding for installation and running of the 
ANM will need to be provided by stakeholders involved in the system e.g. generators, demand 
customers, network owners and operators. 
Similar results are demonstrated in [14] where the value of the ANM increases as the volume of DG 
connection to the system increases. A comparison of different ANM schemes highlights the 
importance of generation curtailment (when used with voltage control) to minimise losses on the 
network, and reduce investment costs. The exclusion of generation curtailment would result in larger 
Static Var Compensator (SVC) required for voltage control on the network. To contrast, the exclusion 
of SVC from the ANM scheme reduces losses and investment costs when compared with the use of 
both curtailment and SVC. However, this will increase curtailment on the network – which could result 
in higher operational costs of compensation as part of the contractual arrangement.  
5 Connection and System Charging 
5.1 Transmission 
The purpose of system charging is to allow the transmission owner (National Grid in England and 
Wales, and Scottish Hydro Electrics Transmission Ltd (SHETL) and Scottish Power Transmission 
(SPT) in Scotland) or system operator (National Grid) to recover the costs of the service they provide 
at a reasonable rate of return.  
Currently, all users (both generation and demand) who wish to connect to the GB Main Integrated 
Transmission System (MITS) must pay a Connection Charge, a Transmission Network Use of System 
(TNUoS) Charge and a Balancing Service Use of System (BSUoS) Charge.  
The Connection Charge is related to the costs of assets installed in order for that user to be able to 
connect to the transmission system. These costs can include: civil costs, engineering costs, land 
clearance and preparation costs.  
The TNUoS Charge covers the cost of installing and maintaining the National Electricity Transmission 
System (NETS) i.e. the physical connection costs which is not specific to the connection site, which is 
covered by the connection charge The Maximum Allowed Revenue (MAR) is set by OFGEM during 
the pricing control review for each transmission network operator (TNO). The recovery of TNUoS 
revenue is split between generation and demand 27% to 73% respectively. 
The BSUoS Charge allows the GB System Operator to recover the costs incurred in balancing the 
transmission system i.e. ensuring safe and secure supply to end users. National Grid is incentivised 
by Ofgem, the gas and electricity regulator, to acquire these balancing services in a cost effective 




manner. The Statement of the Balancing Services Use of System charging methodology can be found 
within the Use of System Charging Methodology (page 72 onwards) [15].  
5.2 Distribution  
Similarly to transmission network users, distribution network users must pay Connection charges and 
Distribution Network Use of System (DNUoS) charges.  
Depending the location of size of the connectee, the DNO may have to modify an existing part of the 
network in order to accommodate the generation connection e.g. reinforcements to the network. In 
addition to charges for network modifications, charges can include  
 Connection application fees 
 System/feasibility/fault level studies 
 Provision of wayleaves 
 Meetings with DNO or site visits 
 Administration 
 Metering charges 
Costs of connection paid in full by the connectee include shallow connection costs, e.g. any additional 
assets required to connect into the network. Any reinforcement required to the shared distribution 
network is split between the DNO and the connectee. However, reinforcement costs in excess of 
£200/kW will be charged to the connectee in full.  
The split of costs between connectee and DNO is calculated using Cost Apportionment Facts (CAFs). 
There are two variations of CAFs calculations, Security CAF and Fault Level CAF. The choice is 
dependent on the requirement for reinforcement.  
The Common Distribution Charging Methodology (CDCM) [16] is a common tariff structure  used in a 
14 DNO areas to set Use of System tariffs. The aim of CDCM is to encourage DNOs to make the 
most efficient use of network capacity and to reward network users (both generation and demand) 
who manage their import/export patterns to avoid an increase in power flows during peak periods  
DNUoS is categorised by the voltage level at which generation is connected, and the type of meter 
which is installed (Half Hourly (HH) or Non Half Hourly (NHH)).  DNUoS is charged to Electricity 
Suppliers by the DNO for using the network to transport electricity – this cost can then be passed 
through to the customer. Generation is also subject to UoS charging, however these charges are 
currently negative i.e. the generator is seen as negative demand and receives UoS credits.  
Under new CDCM for distribution networks, generators who are connected under a non-firm 
arrangement have a deemed capacity of 0MW, and therefore this section of the UoS charges will be 
zero. Non-firm generators are still required to pay for connection charges in order to obtain connection 
to the network.  
6 Case Study – Orkney ANM Scheme 
A report produced by KEMA [17] on the Orkney ANM scheme highlights the project successes and 
problems encountered during the creation of the scheme.  
The Orkney ANM project was implemented as an alternative solution to network reinforcements. The 
reinforcements were in the form of a new subsea cable linking Orkney to mainland GB grid, which 
would have cost an estimated £30million. Regardless of the construction of the subsea cable, there 
would still be local constraints on the network which would require some form of constraint 
management.  




The total cost of the ANM scheme is £500k. Project developers remained interested in connecting to 
ANM scheme regardless of projected curtailment figures.  
From inception, the Orkney ANM scheme took 6 years to reach operational stage. This lengthy period 
was the result of advanced modelling required for generators, extensive testing, and external causes 
such as planning consent and construction work.  
In order to create the real time ANM system, the appropriate protection systems had to be installed, 
similarly SCADA systems and the controllers and monitors required to operate the ANM system had 
to be installed on the network.  
One of the consultancies involved in the research and development of the Orkney ANM scheme now 
holds a contract with the network to analyse and monitor the total curtailment of the generators 
connected to the network, and to validate the estimates made during connection agreements. The 
same consultancy also provided training packages for the network control room staff.  
The one of the key lessons learned from the Orkney ANM Scheme was the importance of 
communication systems. The communications for each curtail-able site was the responsibility of the 
generator. While some generators installed a more reliable VHF radio link, there were problems with 
existing radio links which operated at a lower frequency. When the communication links between 
generators and network were down, generators were automatically tripped off the system to prevent 
any network problems. However initial due to unreliability of some communication links, this has led to 
large levels of unnecessary curtailment for some generators.  
In the future, the network could set minimum levels of technology which are required for the ANM 
schemes in order to avoid unnecessary curtailment.  
7 Discussion 
The cost of ANM has been demonstrated to be lower than traditional network reinforcements. 
However the mechanism by which costs are recovered by the network needs to be defined.  
As discussed in Section 5, the costs of network reinforcements are recovered through a combination 
of connection and use of system charging depending on the voltage level of the connection. To date, 
the cost of ANM schemes has been largely funded through network research and development funds, 
and schemes such as RPZ and LCNF. As ANM schemes become a ‘business as usual’ model, a 
mechanism by which the network can recover the costs of installing, operating and maintaining an 
ANM system must be established. The model shown in Figure 1 demonstrates the flow of money and 
services between a number of key stakeholders in an ANM scheme. This is a format developed by 
Oxford Business School [18] and has been used to show similar transactions for distribution network 
market structures.  
The base case against which all flows are compared is a standard network configuration, without the 
inclusion of any network management of incentives to encourage renewable energy and most 
domestic electricity users sourcing power from vertically integrated suppliers and large centralised 
generators.  
In Figure 1, the installation of an ANM scheme on the network allows more wind to connect to the 
network. This reduces the volume of electricity provided by conventional generating methods and 
therefore reduces the emissions of the distribution network.  
The cost of the ANM Kit is paid for by the Wind Farm, which will experience lower connection costs 
than that of typical connection agreements.  




There will be higher DNUoS charges due to an increase in Network Equipment and management, this 
however, is lower the the costs which would be incurred if Network Reinforcements were taken 
forward.  
 
Figure 1: Business model of ANM scheme (Based on models produced by Supergen HiDef 
Distributed Energy Business Modelling [18]) 
 
Figure 2: Legend for Business Model in Figure 1.  
In addition to the basic recovery of costs for the construction, operation and maintenance of the ANM 
scheme, there is the option to create ancillary services by incentivising domestic Demand Side 




Management (DDSM). The installation of storage devices in the homes of domestic customers is 
being trialled by Scottish & Southern Electric (SSE) for the Northern Isles New Energy Solutions 
(NINES) project [8]. As part of this project, SSE are also required to come up with a method of 
incentivising the uptake of storage devices in the homes of domestic customers and a mechanism 
through which to distribute the incentive. 
8 Conclusion 
Changes to connection arrangements for generators connecting to ANM schemes could increase 
customer bills; however this increase will be a fraction of the cost which would be incurred as a result 
of network upgrades.  
All costs for creating and managing ANM schemes could be recouped through Use of System (UoS) 
charging by introduction of a market for ancillary services. This market would be simpler than market 
at transmission level. These charges filter down to consumer tariffs. Customers would be entitled to 
‘rewards’ based on their level of participation in ANM schemes.  
DG would participate in a curtailment market where generators bid on a day-ahead basis for access 
to the network during constraints. All costs are recovered during a settlement period which would see 
generators pay or be paid through UoS monthly payments.  
There is potential for ANM schemes to increase consumer bills, however there will be options 
available for customers to participate more actively in ANM schemes through the use of demand-side 
management which can result in rewards for customers, and possible reductions in energy bills.  
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